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Within a simple model of non-localized, Hotelling-type competi-
tion among arbitrary numbers of media outlets we characterize quality
and content of media under dierent ownership structures. Assuming
advertising-sponsored, prot-maximizing outlets, we show that (i) top-
ics sensitive to advertisers can be underreported (self-censored) by all
outlets in the market, (ii) self-censorship increases with the concen-
tration of ownership, (iii) adding outlets, while keeping the number of
owners xed, may even increase self-censorship; the latter result relies
on consumers' most preferred outlets being potentially owned by the
same media companies. We argue that externalities resulting from
self-censorship could be empirically large.
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University, for their generous support and hospitality.\The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes
from this order [the prot earners], ought always to be listened to
with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having
been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous,
but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of
men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public,
who have generally an interest to deceive and even oppress the pub-
lic, and who accordingly have upon many occasions, both deceived and
oppressed it."
Adam Smith { (I.11.264) The Wealth of Nations
\The British press is extremely centralised, and most of it is owned
by wealthy men who have every motive to be dishonest on certain im-
portant topics. But the same kind of veiled censorship also operates
in books and periodicals, as well as in plays, lms and radio. At any
given moment there is an orthodoxy, a body of ideas which it is as-
sumed that all right-thinking people will accept without question." [...]
\Anyone who challenges the prevailing orthodoxy nds himself silenced
with surprising eectiveness."
George Orwell { proposed preface to Animal Farm
1 Introduction
A free, diverse, and independent press has been at the heart of American
democracy since the rst days of the American Republic. It was clear from
the very beginning that this was the cornerstone upon which to build demo-
cratic government. In a famous letter to Edward Carrington of January 16,
1787, Thomas Jeerson wrote
\were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government
without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should
not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. But I should mean that
every man should receive those newspapers and be capable of reading
them."
It now appears that this very foundation of American democracy is again
failing.1 Americans are often systematically misinformed about important
1At the beginning of the twentieth century, commercial inuence had become so em-
bedded in US newspapers that each of the three 1912 presidential candidates (Roosevelt,
1policy issues such as health care reform, global climate change, the 2003 war
in Iraq, the housing and nancial crisis of 2008. At the same time, Polls
conducted by the Pew center consistently and increasingly show Americans
unsatised with the quality of their news coverage.2
To make matters worse, developments in technology, most notably the
internet, are changing the way media are being consumed, and are so far
diverting money away from the newsrooms, thus accelerating what now seems
to be a crisis in journalism especially in the US (e.g., the Pew Annual Report
on the State of the News Media, 2009, 2010, McChesney and Nichols, 2010,
Schirin, 2010). While the reasons for the crisis are multifaceted and go
back several decades, our paper focuses on one particular aspect, commercial
media bias, which we believe captures a key fault in American journalism
(notice that US media are almost entirely privately owned), but also one we
believe may be further signicantly exacerbated by the current crisis and
possible policy reactions to it.
To address the problem of commercial media bias, we develop an indus-
trial organization model of news markets, where advertising-funded, prot-
maximizing and non-ideological media rms decide how accurately and in-
tensively to cover dierent topics, while consumers are assumed to have a
preference for accurate and unbiased information. Our focus is on issues
that are sensitive to advertisers (and/or other sponsors).
We show that (i) concentrated media markets can result in self-censorship
or severe bias on sensitive topics by all outlets acting optimally in a non-
cooperative equilibrium; (ii) increasing concentration can deepen the bias;
Tafts, and Wilson) denounced the press's pro-business bias during their campaigns; in the
same year Congress passed the Newspaper Publicity Act that required newspapers to list
their owners and editors and to clearly demarcate paid advertising from news in order to
qualify for postal subsidies (McChesney, 2004, Ch. 2); in 1922 the American Society of
Newspaper Editors (ASNE) was nally launched and immediately issued a professional
code of ethics for journalists intended to further institute a separation between editorial
content and business interests.
2 E.g, Pew reports of 8/6/2009 and 3/23/2010 nd over 70% of respondents saying
news organizations did either a poor (> 40%) or a fair job (> 30%) at explaining proposed
health care plans. Also, a Pew report of 9/13/2009 nds a steadily decreasing public's
rating of accuracy of news stories (with the number of respondents nding \stories often
inaccurate" increasing from 34% to 63% between 1985 and 2009). Finally, a Pew report
of 5/23/2004 nds similar trends among journalists.
2(iii) increasing the number of subsidiary outlets owned by media companies,
keeping the number of owners xed, can also contribute to deepening the
bias, depending among other things on the degree of capture of the audience
by individual media rms.
The channel through which bias occurs in our model is the dependence
of media on advertising revenues that in turn, indirectly, via the sales of the
advertisers' products, depend on the media outlets' coverage. Media outlets
internalize advertiser concerns and the eect of their content on sales of
advertised products and therefore on advertising budgets. Clearly, issues that
are of common concern to advertisers will be more prone to self-censorship.
The model also allows for media to charge their audiences.
Media markets are inherently concentrated and to the extent that mar-
ket protability cannot accommodate suciently many independently owned
media rms, absent alternative funding possibilities, the ensuing concentra-
tion levels may unavoidably lead to biased coverage. Therefore, in spite of
the current diculties experienced by newspapers and other news rms in the
US and elsewhere, our results recommend caution when considering media
mergers as a possible solution. We do not exclude public funding of media
as a possible, and for the time being necessary, way out.3
To illustrate our notion of bias and to give a sense of the possible exter-
nalities involved, we consider two examples: the coverage of tobacco related
health hazards in US media since the 1940's and the more recent coverage
of anthropogenic climate change. Both involve (or involved) industries with
substantial advertising budgets.4
3Clearly, government bias is a reason to be skeptical, but as e.g., McChesney and
Nichols (2010) stress, government funding of media was, by today's standards, not only
substantial in the early days of the American Republic, but it was also understood to be
vital to the democratic process (the amount spent in 1840 as percentage of GDP, largely
for postal subsidies, would correspond to some $30 billion today). They also emphasize
how many or most of the more advanced nations in the world (by many accounts like
the UN's human development index, environmental sustainability, and other political or
press freedom indices) have high rates of public funding of their media. Other important
possibilities inculde setting up endowments for media. See also Schirin (2010).
4Tobacco companies such as Brown & Williamson (part of British American Tobacco)
or Philip Morris (previously part of Altria Group) as well as for instance car manufacturers
such as General Motors or Ford have consistently been top advertisers in the US at dierent
points in time (e.g., Baker, 1994, and Advertising Age, 2007).
3For decades, despite hundreds of thousands of deaths a year, serious sta-
tistical and medical evidence about the health hazards of smoking were kept
away from mainstream commercial media (e.g., Baker, 1994, and Bagdikian,
2004, have chronologies, Chaloupka and Warner, 2000, discusses statistical
evidence on the impact of advertising on the (non-)coverage of tobacco re-
lated health hazards). Bagdikian (2004, pp. 250-252) summarizes
\In 1980 [...] there were still more stories in the daily press about
the causes of inuenza, polio, and tuberculosis than about the cause of
one in every seven deaths in the United States," so that \[a]s late as
fourteen years after the Surgeon General cited serious health risks from
smoking, and seven years after the Surgeon General declared that even
second-hand smoking may cause lung cancer, 64 million Americans,
obviously already addicted, smoked an average of 26 cigarettes a day."
Baker (1994, p. 51) adds that in the same period surveys indicated that
\half the general and two-thirds the smoking population [did] not think
smoking made 'a great deal of dierence' in life expectancy."5
This paper claims that, alongside advertising, concentration in media markets
plays an important role in aggravating the bias. By focusing on industrial
organization aspects of the media markets our framework allows to quantify
the role of the media ownership structure on the degree of self-censorship.
Our second example concerns the coverage of anthropogenic climate change.
In a comprehensive study of the scientic literature, Oreskes (2004) nds that
of all the 928 peer-reviewed papers published between 1993-2003 none (0%)
disagree with the \scientic consensus position" that \most of the observed
global warming over the last 50 years is due to the greenhouse gas concentra-
tion." At the same time, in a study of the US newspaper coverage, Boyko
and Boyko (2004) nd that over half (53%) of a random sample of arti-
cles published in quality US national newspapers6 between 1988-2002, give
5In 2009, according to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention of the US Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, cigarette smoking remained the leading preventable
cause of death in the US, accounting for approximately 1 of every 5 deaths (= 443,000
people; including 49.400 deaths from second hand smoking) per year.
6New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and Wall Street Journal.
4equal attention to the scientic consensus position on one side and to the
industry-supported view on the other that \natural uctuations suce to
explain global warming." Consistent with our model, Boyko (2008) nds
even more bias in the US TV news (70% of randomly selected news segments7
giving the \balanced" view) which are both more heavily funded by adver-
tising and also more concentrated than the US national print media; also, in
a similar study of the Indian news coverage, Billett (2010) nds dramatically
less bias among quality Indian national newspapers in English language,8
where there is almost a complete endorsement of the scientic consensus po-
sition (98% of randomly selected articles). Notice that the Indian newspaper
market is substantially more competitive than the US one. This takes us to
the next point: the role of concentrated media markets.
A further motivation for our analysis is the ongoing media policy debate
in the United States, which especially following the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, has seen a signicant wave of consolidation in US media industries.
Moreover, in a media landscape that is arguably exceedingly concentrated
already,9 the Federal Communications Commission has attempted twice (in
2003 and 2007) to further loosen ownership rules (McChesney, 2004, contains
an extensive discussion of the 2003 attempt).
While empirical evidence on the eects of concentration on commercial
bias or quality of coverage is admittedly meager, a PEJ study of local televi-
sion news over a ve year period summarizes that \overall the data strongly
suggest [..] heavy concentration of ownership in local television by a few large
corporations will erode the quality of news Americans receive."10 Moreover,
7Taken from ABC World News Tonight, CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News and
also from three CNN programs.
8Times of India, Hindu, Hindustan Times, and Indian Express.
9According to Bagdikian (2004) ve media conglomerates (Time Warner, Disney, News
Corporation, Viacom, and Bertelsman) produce more than half of all of US mass media
consumption; a number he put around fty in the early 1980's, claiming excessive con-
centration even then. Compaine and Gomery (2000) and Noam (2009) contain important
qualications and updates of these gures; see also Baker (2007) on the notion of \relevant"
market; McChesney (2004) speaks of three-tiered media markets.
10PEJ study of 4/23/2003, \Does Ownership Matter in Local Television News?" Lacy
and Blanchard (2003) nd indirect evidence that competition increases quality of news
reporting. Ho and Quinn (2009) nd mixed evidence of mergers on reporting diversity of
editorials on nonunanimous Supreme Court decisions in 25 top newspapers from 1988-2003.
5trends emerging from Pew reports mentioned above on increasing dissatisfac-
tion among consumers and journalists documented since the mid 1980's are
consistent with our results given the simultaneous rise in general media con-
centration.11 Evidence on the result that increasing the number of subsidiary
outlets owned, while keeping the number of owners xed, can adversely aect
accuracy, is even weaker. Though, possibly the most pronounced nding of
the above mentioned PEJ study of 4/23/2003 is that \smaller [TV] station
groups tended to produce higher quality newscasts than stations owned by
larger companies by a signicant margin." Clearly more empirical evidence
is needed to link some of these trends to the more specic variables emerging
from our analysis.
At the center of our model are media outlets' advertising revenues and a
generic information variable (x) measuring the amount of information pro-
vided by the outlets on \sensitive" topics. We make the following key as-
sumptions: (A1) Advertisers spend a xed fraction ( > 0) of their sales on
ads; (A2) advertisers advertise with all outlets in proportion to their audi-
ence shares (si  0); (A3) nal sales of advertised products can be written
as C(x) = '(x)C0, where '() is a decreasing function of the sensitive infor-
mation variable x, and C0 is an exogenously given level of base consumption
of advertised products. Assumptions (A1){(A3) combined imply that me-
dia outlet i's advertising revenues can be written as siC(x), where C() is
decreasing in x.
The idea of (A3) is that repeated exposure to sensitive information may
put o consumers from buying certain products or may make them disposed
towards policies that eventually decrease nal expenditures on advertised
products and hence decrease advertising revenues of media outlets. (A1) and
(A2) are essentially approximations. Schmalensee (1972) shows that (A1) can
be optimal in many cases and also provides empirical support; Baghestani
11E.g., a Pew report of 9/13/2009 nds that the number of respondents thinking \[n]ews
organizations are inuenced by powerful people/organizations" increased from 53% to 74%
between 1985 and 2009; simiarly, a Pew report of 5/23/2004 nds, among other things,
that journalists \fear more than ever that the economic behavior of their companies is
eroding the quality of journalism. In particular, they think business pressures are making
the news they produce thinner and shallower. And they report more cases of advertisers
and owners breaching the independence of the newsroom."
6(1991), Jung and Seldon (1995), and Elliott (2001) contain further empirical
evidence; (A2) implicitly assumes advertisers value consumers equally, and
essentially abstracts from issues of targeting, whereby advertisers strategi-
cally target audiences of particular interest to them.12
In particular, we do not model the \direct" (punishment) eect advertis-
ers may have on media outlets if they (or advertising agencies representing
them) can withdraw their ads in response to excessively critical coverage.
This is modeled in detail in Ellman and Germano (2009, Section 4) and
shown to lead to underreporting on sensitive topics also by competing out-
lets. Here instead we focus on the \indirect" channel that occurs through
reduced sales of advertised products. While we believe both eects are em-
pirically relevant, it is with the indirect eect that concentration plays a
more important role. Because of the public good nature of the information
variable x, the more concentrated the media markets, the more media rms
internalize the (indirect) eect of their reporting on sales of advertised prod-
ucts and hence on their own advertising revenues, and the more they are
willing to underreport sensitive information.
A further interpretation of the variable x { probably more pertinent to TV
outlets { is the amount of \critical" programming in the sense of the inverse
of \dumbed down" content. The latter may improve the eectiveness of
advertising on the reception and eventual consumption of advertised products
(see, e.g., Ellman and Germano, 2009, Section 1.5). Baker (1994, 2007),
Bagdikian (2004), McChesney (2004), and Hamilton (2004) present evidence
suggesting an increase in \dumbed down" content in the US over the last
decades, which is consistent with our results given the simultaneous increase
in media concentration. Clearly, a rigorous and empirical analysis of the
12Allowing for targeting may actually strengthen our results in the following sense.
Assume advertisers concentrate their advertising budget on a subset of outlets. Then
self-censorship on sensitive topics would be even more likely on those outlets, while it
may well be absent on the other ones. Average awareness might be higher than without
targeting. However, to the extent that (negtive) externalities from not reporting on these
sensitive topics originate from consumption of the products, since it is mainly the targeted
audience consuming the advertised products, self-censorship when allowing for targeting
being higher for the targeted audience, could mean higher consumption and so even lower
overall welfare through the the externalities.
7relationship needs to be carried out.13
Related literature. Meanwhile there is a large and growing economics
literature on the role of competition on quality of media provision. In an early
paper, Steiner (1952) shows how a monopoly rm owning multiple media
outlets can provide coverage that is more dierentiatiated and so closer to
the social optimum than if the outlets were separately owned. This has been
an important argument favoring consolidation.
More recently, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008a) survey the literature on me-
dia bias and competition and distinguish between demand and supply driven
bias. Competition is generally seen as being relatively ineective in disci-
plining bias that is driven by the audience's preferences, (e.g., Mullainathan
and Shleifer, 2005), whereas, it can play an important role in mitigating bias
driven on the supply side (e.g., Besley and Prat, 2006). Most of the eco-
nomics literature focuses on political inuence in the media. An important
class of models relating to commercial inuence are the targeting models,
where programming is tailored to viewers most valued by advertisers. This
leads to corresponding biases in programming (e.g., cultural bias as in George
and Waldfogel, 2003, or political bias as in Str omberg, 2004; see also Hamil-
ton, 2004) which are also ultimately driven by the preferences of the audience
(who are targeted) and so again competition need not help to reduce this kind
of bias. Gal-Or et al. (2010) combines both audience and advertiser driven
biases and shows some important qualications of the polarizing eects of
competition derived in Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005).
Ellman and Germano (2009) study advertiser inuence and explicitly
model advertisers and consumers, besides the media outlets. In particu-
lar, they allow advertisers to choose with whom to advertise and whether to
withdraw their ads from individual outlets upon observing too critical cover-
13Another related aspect concerns the quality of educational, social, or \public interest"
content of commercial media. Downs (1957) famously argued that this type of content
would be underprovided by commercial media, see also Hamilton (2004); Putnam (2000)
attributes a substantial part of the civil disengagement he documents in the United States
to TV and other electronic media. Testing commercial media's performance in this respect
seems worthwhile. Prat and Str omberg (2006) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008b) present
some evidence on this.
8age (direct eect). Competition is generally benecial in reducing advertiser
bias, but it need not always help. Blasco et al. (2010) study an interesting
model where advertisers compete among each other in order to get favored
coverage from competing media rms.
Armstrong and Weeds (2007) also use a Hotelling-type model to evaluate
the role of advertising, pay TV, and public broadcasting on the quality of
programming. Their focus with advertising concerns the funding of program-
ming and the disutility from having to watch ads (see also e.g., Anderson and
Coate, 2005). To their analysis our paper adds that advertising may not only
cause welfare loss through the disutility of watching ads but also through its
eect on content. As is clear from our examples, this can lead to substantial
externalities that should be taken into account when computing the \e-
cient" amount of advertising. More particularly it suggests caution when
recommending abandoning public broadcasting.
Finally, there are several empirical papers estimating the eect of adver-
tising on media coverage. Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) provides empirical
evidence of bias favoring mutual funds advertising in nancial publications.
Gambaro and Puglisi (2009), Rinallo and Basuroy (2009), and De Smet and
Vanormelingen (2010) present similar evidence for broader sets of advertis-
ers. Wilbur (2008) uses a two-sided market framework to show that TV
network program choices are inuenced more by advertiser than by viewer
preferences. These papers also generally show how larger advertising bud-
gets lead to more bias, but they do not address the role of concentration or
consolidation in the media.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model used
throughout the paper, Section 3 contains all the main results while Section 4
contains a brief welfare analysis. The robustness and some extensions of the
results are explored in Section 5, and nally Section 6 concludes. Most proofs
are contained in the Appendix.
92 The Framework
In order to capture multiple outlets all in competition with each other, we
work with Chen and Riordan's (2007) generalization of Hotelling's model
that in our aplication allows for n media outlets to compete for audience
(and indirectly advertisers) in a non-localized fashion.
There are n ( 2) commercial media outlets, assumed to maximize prots
derived from advertising and payments from the audience minus costs of
producing the programming, that are located at the n endpoints of a star-
shaped network with n spokes (one for each outlet). Each endpoint has
a distance 1
2 to the center of the network so that any two endpoints (and
therefore any two outlets) have distance 1 from each other. (In particular,
there is no outlet located at the center.)
There is a mass one of consumers uniformly distributed along the n spokes
of the network. As in Chen and Riordan (2007), consumers receive a positive
valuation v > 0 and therefore have a preference for only two of the n outlets,
namely, the outlet corresponding to the spoke the consumer is located on and
another one chosen at random with uniform probability from all the remain-
ing n   1 outlets.14 This guarantees continuity and signicantly simplies
the analysis.
When having to \travel" from their location to one of the two preferred
outlets, consumers incur transportation costs measured at a xed rate t > 0
per unit distance. Therefore, since any two points on the network have
distance at most 1 from each other, transportation costs are between 0 and
t, depending on the location of the consumer: A consumer located at the
endpoint of a spoke incurs a transportation cost of 0 for consuming the outlet
located at the same endpoint, and incurs a cost of t for consuming the other
outlet instead; otherwise, consumers incur transportation costs less than t
2 to
consume the outlet at the endpoint of the spoke on which they are located,
and greater than t
2 to consume the other one instead; clearly, the closer the
14Chen and Riordan's (2007) original model allows for the \uncovered" case with N( n)
potential and n actual brands, so that if N > n some consumers may have a preference
for just one or zero actually available brands. We study the \covered" case where N = n,
where each consumer has a preference for exactly two brands.
10consumer is located to the center the closer the transportation cost to any
outlet will be to t
2. Finally, to get a sense of its size, t can be interpreted
loosely as representing the maximum that \most faithful" readers are willing
to pay to access their most preferred newspaper when forced to read their
second-best choice instead.
There is an exogenous degree of horizontal product dierentiation be-















 1 if ui   uj <  t
ui uj
t if jui   uj j  t
1 if ui   uj > t
;
where t > 0 is the transportation cost and ui is the utility (gross of trans-
portation costs) oered by outlet i.
Specically, the utility oered by outlet i is dened by
ui = v + xi + yi   pi ; (2)
where v   +  is the xed exogenous valuation, which for any consumer
is positive for exactly two outlets: the one at the endpoint of the spoke
where the consumer is located, and the other preferred outlet; xi 2 [0;1] is
accuracy or amount of information reported on sensitive topics; yi 2 [0;1] is
an endogenous measure of quality unrelated to xi; pi  0 is the price charged
by outlet i; 0  ;  t are parameters. To get the overall utility of outlet i
to a consumer located at some point ` on the network, one subtracts from ui
the transportation cost, obtained as t multiplied with the distance between
` and the endpoint where outlet i is located.
Assuming jui   uj j  t, which we assume throughout unless otherwise
















11where u = 1
n 1
P
j6=i uj is averaged over outlets other than i. Unlike the
Salop model, where a given rm can essentially only compete with its two
neighbors, here all outlets are in direct competition with each other. Any
two pair of outlets compete over a share of 2
n(n 1) consumers. Their strategic
variables are xi;yi, and pi.
Expenditure on advertiser products plays a crucial role throughout the
paper since it drives advertising revenues of media rms and at the same
time makes the link with \sensitive" information xi. We assume aggregate
expenditure takes the reduced form
C(x) = (1    
n X
i=1
sixi)  C0 ; (4)
where x = (x1;:::;xn) is the vector of information levels of the dierent
outlets, and   2 [0;1) is a constant representing the marginal eect of in-
formation on nal aggregate expenditure. This assumes that more accurate
information (or less bias) captured by a higher value of the xi's depresses
overall expenditure at the rate  .15
Media outlets maximize prots, which for outlet i are given by






where C() is total expenditure dened in Eq. (4), and  and  are xed
parameters satisfying 0   < 1,  >
C0
n . (The assumption on  ensures
that yi 2 [0;1].) The rst and second expressions represent revenues from
advertising and from the audience respectively; the third expression repre-
sents variable costs of producing quality or programming (y). We assume
that advertising revenues are a xed share of total sales of the advertised
products weighted by the audience share of the outlet.
The main object of the present paper can be viewed as studying the im-
plications of a positive   on the strategic variables of media rms, especially,
the eect on the accuracy variable x.
15More precisely, outlet i increasing xi depresses expenditure by a factor si . This
implicitly assumes that information provided by outlet i does not spread to audiences
of other outlets. In Section 5 we show that allowing information to spread across other
outlets' audiences can lead to even more self-censorship.
12Some Interpretations. Generally speaking, the information variable
x represents a variety of news topics that can range from how products
are produced to what they may contain and whether they satisfy certain
standards or ethical norms, all the way to what health care system should be
adopted or whether severe measures should be taken to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. Since the model is static, x can be thought of as a long-term
accuracy of reporting measure for the dierent outlets, and we assume that
it is consistent with the standard norms of professional journalism.
Ellman and Germano (2009, Section 1.5) contain further discussion and
interpretation as well as a simple derivation, within a context of Bayesian
rational agents, of the fact that accuracy as measured by a variable such as
x (where higher x means less suppression of bad news) may have a negative
impact on expected quantities sold by advertisers. This can be done even if
(consistent with journalism standards) media outlets do not falsify informa-
tion. Essentially, it follows if bad news about advertisers' products can be
withheld (without the consumers knowing exactly what is withheld), and so
this can shift downwards consumers' posteriors on the value of the products
advertised. Anderson and McLaren (2010) contains a related derivation.
Clearly, to the extent that x represents \bad" news that aects all adver-
tisers, the eect will be larger than if it only aects few advertisers, or it will
be larger than if some of the aected advertisers' products can be substituted
with other advertised products. We do not in fact exclude that accuracy on
topics that negatively aect some advertisers may benet others (we come
back to this in Section 5.1), but the focus throughout is on the case where
the net eect on demand is negative, namely of the order   .
Also worth pointing out is that consumers are assumed to be aware of the
level of x as media outlets are implicitly assumed to be evaluated over periods
of time long enough for readers to make an opinion about the reputation and
accuracy of coverage. However, we do not exclude that a low value of 
can reect readers not much aware of sensitive issues (we come back to this
question in Section 5.5). When x concerns public issues, a small value of 
may also reect free-riding on others to be informed, as argued for instance
by Downs (1957) and Hamilton (2004).
13Finally, when comparing networks or ownership structures with dierent
numbers of outlets or rms we understand that consumers are redistributed
along the netwrok according to an (unmodeled) equilibrium. To emphasize
the robustness of our main results, however, in Section 3.5, we consider al-
ternative frameworks, namely, the Salop and the mulinomial logit models,16
where the preferences of the consumers (location along the network) remain
xed when changing the ownership structure. Germano (2009) studies the
original \uncovered" spokes model of Chen and Riordan (2007).
3 Self-censorship in commercial media
Commercial media are assumed to maximize prots as described in Eq. (5).
We start our study of commercial media bias with the case of purely adver-
tising funded media, before turning to the more general case where revenues
include payments from the audience.
3.1 Purely advertising funded media
Here we consider purely advertising funded media so that pi = 0 by assump-
tion for all outlets i 2 N. From the symmetric FOC's (see the appendix for

















(1    x)C0   y = 0
which, yields y =

nt(1  x)C0 for the level of quality, while for the level of








as the locus of (x;n)'s such that @
@xi = 0 (notice that the SOC's are auto-
matically satised here). To take into account the constraint x 2 [0;1] we
16See respectively, Tirole (1988) and Anderson et al. (1992) for expositions.
14Figure 1: x(n) as a function of n [t = 5 (grey) or 10 (black);  =   = :1]




and   n =
 t
(1    )
;
so that, for n <  n, we have x = 0 as the unique solution; while for n >   n, we
have x = 1 as the unique solution; for intermediate values n 2 [ n;   n] we have
x = 1
    t





0 if n <  n
1
    t
n if  n  n <   n
1 if n    n
(7)
We can state our rst main result.
Proposition 1 In a market with n purely advertising funded media outlets
there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with: severe bias (xi = 0 for all i) if
n <  n; no bias (xi = 1 for all i) if n    n; intermediate bias (xi = 1
    t
n 2
[0;1] for all i) in the range  n  n <   n, where  n =
 t
 and   n =
 t
(1  ). The
level of quality is given by yi =
C(x)
nt where x = xi for all i.
15Severe media bias (or self-censorship) occurs when too few outlets (n <  n)
are active in the market; in equilibrium they all endogeneously choose the
lowest possible level of reporting on sensitive topics (x = 0). The larger the
transportation costs (t) and the marginal eect of information on consump-
tion ( ), and the smaller the preference for accuracy parameter (), the more
outlets are needed to avoid self-censorship. Two reasons the parameter  can
be low are if there is already low awareness of the issues to begin with, or
if, as Downs (1957) has argued, viewers free ride on others being informed.
On the other hand, when transportation costs are suciently small, there is
always a unique, fully informative equilibrium.17
The result follows essentially from the upward slopedness of the (x;n) lo-
cus, Eq. (6), which says that, as the number of outlets n increases, rms want





and jCj = j @C
@xi
xi
C j measure what we call respectively the competitive and the
externality eect of rasing xi. As n increases rms raise accuracy since they
internalize less the eect on sales and hence on advertising revenues. This
in turn follows from the fact that (at the unrestricted symmetric solution x)
the competitive eect is (weakly) increasing in n while the externality eect
is strictly decreasing with n. These relationships hold fairly generally and
both reinforce a positive relation between n and x.18
The additional fact that the (x;n) locus lies below zero when n <  n has
to do with the linear form of the utility functions ui. Clearly, if preferences
between xi and yi were say of the Cobb-Douglas type, then setting either xi
or yi equal to zero would be very costly for the media outlets. In that case
the locus would be above zero for low values of n. However, it is unclear
17Firms have an interest to have t large as it increases prots through either allowing
them to decrease x;y or as we will see also to raise p. In this sense, one may view certain
choices of programming or programming styles as trying to increase t.
18More specically, they can be shown to imply that the slope of the (x;n) locus com-
puted from the FOC condition for xi, @i































16whether this would be a more realistic way of capturing preferences.
3.2 Audience and advertising funded media
We now consider the more general case described at the beginning of the sec-
tion and solve for symmetric equilibria where all media outlets choose simul-
taneously accuracy on the sensitive topic xi, quality yi, and prices charged pi.
In particular, we now allow media outlets to be funded by the audience
through viewer or reader fees pi.
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Solving for (x;y;p) yields
p = [t   C(x)]







where x is again given by Eq. (7) and the values of  n and   n are now








;   n = min

 t






so that if t  C0 then x is either 0 or 1. We can state the following.
Proposition 2 In a market with n advertising and audience funded media
outlets the unique symmetric equilibrium has the following properties:
(a) If potential advertising revenues are large relative to transportation
costs (t < C0),19 then media outlets will choose not to charge their audience
(pi = 0 for all i), and will be exclusively advertising funded. The equilibrium
levels of bias (x) and quality (y) coincide with the ones of Proposition 1.
19Essentially the condition states that transportation costs (t) are no greater than the
maximal total advertising revenue per capita (C0) achieved when xi = 0 for all i.
17(b) If potential advertising revenues are small relative to transportation
costs (t  C0), then media outlets will charge positive prices (pi = t  
C(x)), and there will be: severe bias (xi = 0 for all i) if n < ^ n and no bias
(xi = 1 for all i) if n  ^ n, where ^ n =
 C0





nt , where xi = x for all i.
One can think of the two polar cases considered in the statement, namely
small or large transportation costs relative to potential advertising revenues,
for instance as reecting respectively the cases of free to air television (for
(a)) and print newspapers (for (b)).
Prices are charged only to the extent that advertising revenues are not
sucient to cover the transportation cost (p = [t   C(x)]+). In case (a)
outlets have sucient advertising revenues that they voluntarily choose not to
charge the audience. The number of media outlets necessary to avoid severe
bias is smaller in (b) and increases with the amount of revenues obtained
from advertising (^ n =
 C0
 ).
3.3 Purely audience funded media
If we consider the other limit case of media funded exclusively by the audience
who faces a price pi for accessing outlet i, then by setting  = 0 in the previous
analysis, we immediately get the following statement.
Proposition 3 In a market with n purely audience funded media outlets
there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with no bias (xi = 1 for all i) at




Since there is no funding by advertisers, the audience pays the full fee t
(instead of [t   C(x)]+). This guarantees (essentially by assumption) that
there will be no bias (on advertiser-sensitive topics) and that the ecient
quantities for both x and y are implemented; though this may not necessarily
be preferred by consumers or producers.
183.4 Multiple ownership
In practice a given media rm may own several dierent media outlets which
may be in direct competition with each other.20 For simplicity, we consider
the case where each media rm owns the same number () of media outlets,
and to begin with also assume they are all purely advertising funded. Let n
denote the total number of rms (owners of the outlets), and suppose each













where now x = (x1;x2;:::;xn) 2 [0;1]n. From the FOC's under symmetry





















as the locus of unrestricted (x;n)'s such that
@i
@xki
= 0. Taking into account










n(n 1) if  n()  n <   n()















  n() =
 t + (1    )
2(1    )
+
s
 t + (1    )




(1    )
:
As  n =  n(1) and   n =   n(1), we can state our second main result.
20For instance, in 2010 Clear Channel owned over 1200 radio stations, some of which in
direct competition with each other, Columbia Jounalism Review, Who Owns What, 2010.
19Figure 2:  n() [black] and  n
 [grey] as a function of  [t = 5;  =   = :1]
Proposition 4 In a market with n  2 media rms, each one of which owns
  1 purely advertising funded media outlets, there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium with: severe bias (xki = 0 for all i and ki) when n <  n(); no




n(n 1) 2 [0;1] for all i and ki) when  n()  n    n().
Moreover, allowing rms to own multiple media outlets makes self-censorship
more likely in the the following sense,
 n()   n and   n()    n
for all   1, both with strict inequality unless  = 1, and also
lim




and the same holds for   n() compared to   n.
As expected, what is determinant of whether or not there is self-censorship,
and how much of it there is, is not so much the number of media outlets
20(n) but rather the number of separate owners in the market (n). Somewhat
surprisingly, the result is actually stronger. It says that increasing the number
of media outlets that any media rm can own in fact aggravates the self-
censorship in the following sense. For a xed number of owners, the more
subsidiary outlets there are, the more likely it is that self-censorship occurs.
In Figure 2, we plot (in black) the number of owners ( n()) that are
necessary to avoid severe bias (x = 0). For comparison we also plot (in grey)
 n
, which is the benchmark number of rms necessary to avoid severe bias
if what mattered were only the total number of outlets.21 Notice that  n()
is not only less steeply downward sloping (than the benchmark  n
), but it is
actually upwards sloping! A similar picture obtains for   n().
The intuition for this surprising result stems essentially from the assump-
tion that viewers are interested in two outlets only so that allowing rms to
own multiple outlets gives them additional local monopoly power. Notice
that with n owners each of which owns  media outlets, the share of con-






n(n 1)), which goes from 0 to 1
n2 as  goes from 1 to 1.
The phenomenon of having some share of the audience captured by the same
owner is not totally unrealistic in practice.
At the same time, it should be stressed that the result also clearly depends
on the fact that transportation costs are assumed to be constant as one
varies the number of outlets. With transportation costs decreasing with the
number of outlets added to the network, the numbers  n() and   n() might
also decrease depending on how fast transportation costs are decreasing. As
we discuss in Section 5 below, we believe that the fact that the slope of  n()
and   n() is less than that of  n
 to be the robust nding. Nonetheless, the
fact that it is actually increasing in  here is worth noting also since the
constant transportation cost is an important benchmark which in certain
circumstances may also have empirical validity.
21For an alternative derivation of  n
, assume the owners sub-optimally maximized the
prot of each outlet individually, without taking into account their power to simultaneously
change the behavior of all their outlets. Then the number of outlets necessary to avoid
severe bias would be the original  n from the case  = 1, but because each owner owns 
outlets, the number of owners necessary would be  n
.









































and which we summarize as follows.
Proposition 5 In a market with n  2 media rms, each of which owns
  1 media outlets, the level of quality is relatively lower and prices are
relatively higher than if there were n separately owned media rms.
This is intuitive and follows from the decreased competition (and larger \cap-
tured" audiences) than in the case of all separately owned rms.
3.5 The Logit and the Salop models
We here illustrate the robustness of using the spokes model to describe the
oligopolistic interaction between the outlets in deriving the main results of the
paper. We consider two well-known yet conceptually quite distinct models of
product dierentiation, namely the multinomial logit and the Salop (1979)
model.22 What these models share with the spokes model is that aggregate
demand for media is xed at a mass of unity and does not depend on either
the magnitude of the transportation costs (or the degree of substitutability
between products) nor on the number of outlets (or products) in the market.
We start with the rst main result, namely the existence of certain cut-o
numbers of outlets ( n;   n) below which severe bias occurs (see Propositions 1
22We refer to Tirole (1988) and Anderson et al. (1992) for textbook treatments of these
models, in particular for derivations of the corresponding share equations.
22and 2). The result goes through qualitatively with slightly dierent values




+ 1;   nLogit =
 t
(1    )
+ 1;
obtained from the unrestricted solution xLogit(n) = 1
    t






;   nSalop =
s
 t
(1    )
;
obtained from the unrestricted solution xSalop(n) = 1
    t
n2.23
In particular, if  n and   n denote the cut-os computed for the spokes
model (see Proposition 1), we have
 nLogit =  n + 1;  nSalop =
p
 n;
and the parallel relations for   nLogit and   nSalop. This establishes a fairly tight
relationship between the three models.
Concerning the second main result, namely the existence of cut-o num-
bers of rms for given numbers of subsidiary outlets, one can again show that
rst of all these exist in the two alternative models. To see this we report


















 , they do not increase with the number  of subsidiary outlets, which
23The easiest way to derive the cut-os is from our FOC conditions in the Appendix











where u is the utility level oered by the other outlets.
23is what happens with the spokes model. In the case of the logit model, we can
say more. Namely, the cutos do not depend on  (i.e.,  nLogit() =  nLogit(1)
for all )! This means that the number of owners is exactly what matters in
determining the likelihood of self-censorship in the logit model. Given the
benchmark-like nature of this case, we state it formally.
Proposition 6 In a market with n  2 media rms, each one of which owns
  1 purely advertising funded media outlets competing within a multinomial
logit model, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where the cut-os  nLogit
and   nLogit do not depend on the number of subsidiary outlets .
In particular, allowing rms to own multiple outlets does not aect the
likelihood of self-censorship within the multinomial logit model, and for any
 the symmetric equilibrium corresponds to the one of Proposition 1 where  n
and   n are replaced by  nLogit =  n+1 and   nLogit =   n+1, which do not depend
on .
Comparing again with the spokes model, from Proposition 4, we also have
for any   1,
 nLogit() =  nLogit = lim
!1  n() =  n + 1;
and the parallel relation holds for   nLogit().
We interpret this as suggesting that the number of separate owners of
outlets n() (rather than the number of outlets n) is what really matters
in determining the likelihood of self-censorship. This is particularly clear
with the logit model. On the other hand, the nding that adding outlets
aggravates the likelihood of self-censorship occurs in the spokes model and, for
a rather limited set of parameter values, also in the Salop model. In general,
whether adding outlets aggravates or in fact alleviates the self-censorship
problem depends very much on further aspects of the market such as the
transportation costs and the distribution of the audience among the outlets
of given owners.24 We believe that the benchmark provided by the spokes
model can be relevant in contexts where transportation costs do not go down
24Germano (2007) studies the \uncovered" case of the spokes model, where among other
things, total audience increases as outlets are added. In this case the cut-os  n() and
  n() decrease with , albeit, again, substantially slower than  n
.
24signicantly when adding outlets to the market and where audience can be
\captured" by media rms as discussed in Section 3.4 above.
3.6 Free entry
Next we investigate the eects of allowing free entry into the above markets.
We assume a xed cost K > 0 of operating a given media outlet and solve
for the level of xed costs  K that supports fully informative equilibria, that
is, that supports the possibility of n >  n rms in the market in equilibrium
that make non-negative prots for K <  K.
In the case of n (separately owned) purely commercial media outlets






















If actual xed costs are substantially above the obtained  K, then this means
that fully informative market structures cannot be supported.
4 Welfare analysis
Our main reason of concern for the possibility of self-censorship stems from
potential externalities that can arise from the consequences of not reporting
or misreporting on certain key issues such as anthropogenic climate change.25
Therefore when assessing the overall welfare we assume there is an additional
externality term in the welfare function which depends on x. We write overall
welfare, evaluated at the symmetric solutions studied in the paper, as




25As mentioned, a small  need not mean that consumers do not care about the po-
tential externalities but may simply not be aware of or not care about the corresponding
information; see Downs (1957) and Hamilton (2004).
25where   0 is the weight given to the externalities.
From the FOC we get y =





1 if  +    C0
0 else
for the information variable, so that depending on the size of the externalities
generated it may be optimal to set its level equal to 1 or 0 regardless of the
number of media rms in the market.
5 Robustness
We here relax or replace several of the assumptions made throughout the
paper and discuss the robustness of the main ndings.
5.1 Self-censorship on specic or divided issues
To model the case where advertisers are aected dierently by the variable
x, we consider a slight generalization of the function C(x) dened in Eq. (4).
Let now rms be indexed by  2 [0;1] and suppose rm  is aected by a
marginal amount  () 2 ( 1;1), which we now allow to be both positive or










where F() is a distribution function over the rms. The present paper
can then be viewed as exploring the consequences on x in the case where
^   
R
 ()dF() > 0. All the analysis carried out in the previous sections
carries over directly after substituting ^   for  . In particular, the cut-os




;   n =
^  t
(1   ^  )
:
More specically, if there is a portion of demand (1) aected negatively
by the variable x, another portion (2) aected positively, and a remaining
26component that is unaected. This would give rise to a demand of the form
b C(x) = 1(1    1
X
sixi)C0 + 2(1 +  2
X
sixi)C0 + (1   1   2)C0
=






where  1; 2 > 0 and 1;2  0;1 + 2 < 1. Since now ^   = 1 1   2 2,
it is easy to see that the more the negative and positive eects balance each
other out (1 1  2 2) the smaller the cut-os and the less the problem of
self-censorship. Similarly, if there are only rms aected negatively but their
portion is small (2 = 0 and 1  0) the cut-os are scaled accordingly.
5.2 Costly information gathering
So far throughout the paper, in order to keep the self-censorship separate
from considerations of costs of obtaining the information, we assumed that
media outlets could access it for free. However, fom the derivation of the
optimal levels of quality (yi), which decrease in the number of outlets, one
might think that introducing a cost to access or gather senstive information
(say 
2x2
i) might undo the positive eect of competition on the equilibrium
level xi. This is not the case.
Introducing a cost term to outlet i's prot function, say  
2x2
i, where
 > 0, allows to capture the cost of producing xi in parallel to the cost of
producing quality yi. Solving the FOC for unrestricted x 2 I R gives
x(n) =
n    t




(+ )n2 > 0 with respect to n. Furthermore, this leads
to similar results concerning the cut-os  n and   n of Proposition 1, namely
 n =
 t
 =  n while   n >   n, for any  > 0 (in fact, for  > 0, it could happen
that x < 1 for all n no matter how large). Figure 3 sketches equilibrium
accuracy for the cases  = 0 (in grey) and  = :1 (in black).
This is particularly interesting since it suggests not only that our pre-
vious conclusions are robust, but moreover it points to the sensitivity of
self-censorship to the costs in gathering news. Introducing even slight costs
27Figure 3: x(n) as a function of n with  = 0 [grey] and with  = :1 [black]
of gathering sensitive information can further dramatically increase the self-
censorship problem. In times where newspapers are under nancial con-
straints and the availability of \public relations" materials relatively (and
increasingly) cheap and abundant, it can be particularly attractive for news-
rooms to increasingly rely on public relations sources.26
5.3 Information spreading across consumers
Implicit in our assumption of the aggregate demand for advertisers' products
C(x) dened in Eq. (4), it was assumed that each media outlet's coverage can
only aect its own audience share. One might wonder what happens if there
are spillovers across outlets. To study this case consider the extreme case
26A recent PEJ study of 1/11/2010, \How News Happens," shows how in the Baltimore
area, in the third week of July 2009, around eight out of ten stories reported \simply
repeated or repackaged previously published information"; also 95% of the stories that
contained new information originated from traditional media (most of them from newspa-
pers); and of the new stories over 80% originated directly from either government sources
or other interest groups. See also Davies (2008) and McChesney and Nichols (2010) on
the increasing importance of public relations industries.
28where whatever is reported by any one of the outlets immediately reaches all
viewers. The demand function in this case would take the form
e C(x) = (1      maxfx1; ;xng)  C0 :
In this case, it is easy to see that there will always be an equilibrium with
full accuracy for any number of rms in the market. However, there is also
an equilibrium with self-censorship whenever the parameters are such that
 n > 1 in the benchmark model. To see this consider the FOC, now assuming














((1    xi)    t)
since now @ e C
@xi =   . In particular i's (unrestricted) best response is to
choose xi = 1
    t
, where
xi  0 ()
 t

 1 and xi  1 ()
 t
(1    )
 1:
Note that in the benchmark model  n =
 t
 and   n =
 t
(1  ). This means that,
if the parameters of the model are such that  n < 1, then self-censorship is not
a best-reply for i and so is not an equilibrium if information spreads imme-
diately across consumers, but it is also not an equilibrium in the benchmark
model. If, however, the parameters are such that  n  1 then self-censorship
is an equilibrium for any n in the model where information spreads whereas
it is an equilibrium in the benchmark model only if n   n. In other words,
allowing inormation to spread across outlets allows for equilibria with more
self-censorship, meaning that (in the extreme case of perfect spreading across
outlets) self-censorship can occur whenever it would occur in the benchmark
model with a single outlet, but it would now occur regardless of the number
of outlets in the market.
5.4 Individual advertising contracts
In this paper we have focused on advertising payments determined by the ad-
vertisers' total sales and by the audience shares of the outlets; in particular,
29Figure 4: x(n) as a function of n with  xed [black] and with (x) [grey]
they were not made contingent upon a certain type of coverage by the outlets.
Often, however, advertisers do make personalized contracts which allow for
the possibility of withdrawing its advertising when observing a media outlet
reporting too heavily on sensitive issues. This was modeled explicitly in Ell-
man and Germano (2009, Section 4) and can be captured in our model, e.g.,
by multiplying rm i's advertising revenues by i(xi) =1fxi xg, meaning that
advertisers immediately withdraw their ads whenever xi >  x and  x 2 [0;1).
This strengthens our case for self-censorship to the extent that it increases
incentives for media outlets to set xi   x without weakening incentives to
otherwise set xi = 0 coming from the analysis of Section 3 and also without
weakening the eect of concentration on the choice of xi.
5.5 (Un)awareness and acquired tastes
An aspect of the media that is often considered important is the endogeneity
of tastes and awareness of the consumers. Here this could be modeled as
allowing the parameter  depend on the level of reporting on sensitive issues
30so that (x) is weakly increasing in x. The idea is that low levels of reporting
on an issue generate less awareness and therefore also less \taste" for the
issue, or alternatively, repeated reporting on an issue can increase awareness
and taste for it. If one adds this feature to the model, then, depending on
the strength of the reinforcement eect, one can obtain a tendency towards
multiple equilibria in the sense that, everithing else equal, there can be both
more equilibria with severe bias for a larger numbers n >  n and at the same
time more equilibria with no bias for smaller numbers n <   n. Without going
into formal derivations, Figure 4 sketches the larger (grey) set of equilibria.27
6 Concluding remarks
At a time when journalism and news media are facing serious nancial dif-
culties, it may seem natural to allow and maybe even encourage mergers
between media rms. This paper recommends caution with such measures
and emphatically argues against it in markets where the ownership struc-
ture is already more concentrated than suggested by the cut-os ( n and   n).
Mergers in such concentrated markets would strengthen self-censorship and
therefore lead further away from the democratic ideal of an informed public.
To take a last example. Consider the recent { and not so recent { coverage
of the health care reform in the US.28 With an expenditure of around 17% of
GDP (or over $7.200 per capita per year), health care in the US is about twice
as expensive per capita as in other developed countries. At the same time,
with over 45 million uninsured it consistently ranks at the lower end of studies
evaluating health care systems in industrialized countries.29 The eorts of the
current administration to pass legislation to reform the health care system
fell short of solving key issues like providing universal health care coverage
27The reason the locus of unrestricted (x;n)'s can now be (partially) downward sloping
is due not to the introduced non-linearites but to non-convexities of preferences.
28See e.g., B. Ehrenreich, \The Medical-Industrial Complex," New Yorker Review of
Books, December 17, 1970, for a view of 40 years ago.
29E.g., the recent Commonwealth Fund study ranks the US system last among a group
of industrialized countries including Germany, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, New
Zealand and Canada, reported in Bloomberg Businessweek,\US Health care ranks low
among developed nations," June 23, 2010.
31and a public health plan option,30 that would have moved the system closer
to some of the \better" performing ones in Europe and elsewhere. As some
argue, these issues were never really taken seriously by mainstream media.31
For us, this is a further example of a topic with important externalities
and substantial commercial interests that might potentially be subject to
commercial bias.32
As with the our previous examples, externalities from potentially com-
mercially biased coverage can be large; though, clearly there are many other
channels that can lead to biased coverage in the media and many more that
can impede \reasonable" policies from being adopted. Already Adam Smith
(1904, I.11.264) remarked that
\prot" earners \employ the largest capitals, and by their wealth
draw to themselves the greatest share of the public consideration;"
and at the same time also pointed to the fact that their interests and those of
the rest of society could be in conict with each other. To the extent that the
media play an decisive role in the political decision-making process, Smith's
remarks get to the essence of some our concerns, namely, that advertiser
funded media may fail to provide adequate coverage on certain issues of
concern to society.
Arguing from a dierent angle, Downs (1957) (see also Hamilton, 2004)
30Or more fundamentally of changing \how medical care is organized, paid for and
delivered;" see A. Relman, \Health Care: The Disquieting Truth," New Yorker Review
of Books, September 30, 2010. Relman also points to the \commercialization" or \prot-
driven" aspects of large segments of the US health system as a main source of higher costs
of health care in the US; see also A. Relman, \The Health Reform We Need and Are Not
Getting," New Yorker Review of Books, July 2, 2009.
31E.g., CNN senior medical corespondent Elizabeth Cohen stated: \Fifteen years ago
you [heard] people saying: Let's have a single-payer system like Canada [..] You don't hear
that as much as you used to. So people are on the same page more than they once were."
(CNN, March 5, 2009). See also the mentioned Pew reports of 8/6/2009 and 3/23/2010
on the public's discontent with the general media coverage of the health care reform.
32See e.g., M. Tomasky, \The Money Fighting Health-Care Reform," New Yorker Review
of Books, April 8, 2010, or Eaton, J., Pell, M.B., and A. Mehta, \Washington Lobbying
Giants Cash in on Health Reform Debate," Center for Public Integrity, March 26, 2010,
on the extent of commercial interests involved in the health care reform; many of the
private companies involved (insurance, pharmaceutical, medical service providers) clearly
also had common interests on many key issues at stake.
32argued that news relevant to individuals as citizens and to their political
choices would be underprovided due to free-riding and insucient (\ratio-
nal") demand on their part. In our model, such low demand can be captured
by a small preference parameter (  0), making such topics particularly
prone to underreporting in equilibrium (see the formulas for the cut-os  n
and   n). In other words, the sensitivity to advertisers combined with this ad-
ditional eect of being in low demand by viewers, suggests topics particularly
vulnerable to self-censorship.
Clearly, more empirical work is needed to validate the picture sketched
by the present paper, particularly the phenomenon and extent of advetiser
driven bias, identifying relevant topics and the role of concentration in me-
dia markets, as well as that of the number of subsidiary outlets owned. The
formulas and stylized facts derived can all in principle be tested emprically.
Besides measures of media bias,33 the formulas depend on measures of con-
centration, transportation costs,34 interest in (or awareness of) sensitive top-
ics,35 advertising budgets, and the potential eect on sales of reporting on
the given topics.
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) study political bias in US daily newspapers.
Using sophisticated empirical methodology, they conclude that readers' own
ideological biases are a signicant factor driving political slant; they nd
much less evidence of slant originating from media owners' ideological bi-
ases. Their paper does not, however, touch on the issue of commercial bias.
It would be instructive to apply their methodology to test for this. Sepa-
rating advertiser from demand driven bias may prove dicult, and it may
be necessary to endogenize viewers' demand to allow for actual coverage and
positions taken by political parties to inuence it. Analyzing the coverage of
the health care reform in the US or of climate change (ideally cross-country)
would be fascinating and hopefully not impossible.
33E.g., Boyko and Boyko (2004), Reuter and Zitzweitz (2006), or Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2010).
34Bronnenberg et al. (2010) can be interpreted as estimating empirical transportation
costs for consumer packaged goods.
35The PEJ and the Pew Research Center keep respectively a News Coverage Index and
a News Interest Index for what are most covered and most followed stories on a weekly
basis in US media.
33Appendix
Proofs of Propositions 1{3. We need to show existence and uniqueness
of the symmetric equilibrium characterized in the propositions. We show it






























































Assuming symmetry we have xi = x;yi = y;pi = p and si = 1














The fact that @C
@xi is negative and decreasing in n in absolute value is crucial
for the main results of the paper.




























































































Solved for (unrestricted) (x;y;p) this yields,










To conclude the proof, we need to verify the SOC's. First notice, that
all second-order derivatives of the shares si;sj with respect to xi;xj and also















































































From here, Proposition 1 follows immediately. Propositions 2 and 3 follow
after checking negative deniteness of the matrix of second derivatives H on
the relevant subspaces, which follows from checking positive deniteness for
the following matrix























C C C C
A
also on the relevant subspaces. In particular, we can use t  C0, 1




(1  ), since outside these bounds either xi or pi is xed and so the
relevant submatrix is positive denite. It suces therefore to check that (1)
35detP1 > 0, (2) detP2 > 0, and (3) detP > 0, where P1 and P2 are respectively
the top-left 1  1 and 2  2 submatrices of P. Clearly, (1) is satised; (2)
reduces to 4n2t > 2 C0 which with  
C0
n and the conditions above
reduces to  < 2t; (3) reduces to
t
 




which again using the above conditions holds whenever   t. The latter
condition is assumed throughout the paper.






































































Notice also that @C
@yi = @C
@pi = 0. From this we compute the FOC's (again





























































































as the locus of (unrestricted and symmetric) (x;n;;t)'s such that @
@xi = 0.
To take into account the constraint x 2 [0;1] we need to solve x(n;;t) = 0
and x(n;;t) = 1 for n, which gives the solutions respectively
 n() =











  n() =
 t + (1    )
2(1    )
+
s
 t + (1    )




(1    )
;
which are easily veried to satisfy the properties stated in the proposition.
































































2 (   1)C0
(n)2(n   1)t
=






 2 (n   2)C0
(n)2(n   1)t
+
2 (   2)C0
(n)2(n   1)t
=
 2 (n   1)C0
(n)2(n   1)t
from which we can immediately see that the relavant matrix of second order
derivatives is negative semi-denite for   1.
Proof to Proposition 5. As before we have, @C
@yi = @C




































































































































































Proof of Proposition 6, the Salop and Logit cases. We only check the
case of the multinomial logit model; the case of the Salop model is similar to
the other two. Suppose   1, then as before, @C
@xi =
  C0


























































































((n   1)   (   1))(1    x)
t


















as the locus of (unrestricted and symmetric) (x;n;;t)'s such that @
@xi = 0.
Notice it does not depend on ! To take into account the constraint x 2 [0;1]





+ 1 and   n() =
 t
(1    )
+ 1 ;
which are easily veried to satisfy the properties stated in the proposition.
Verifying the SOC's, nally, is tedious but analogous to the case of the spokes
model.
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